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ABSTRACT:  
 In this brief article, we will try and sum up the main recent changes to Portuguese labor law. 
Although there were signs of evolution since 2003 (with the adoption of the Labor Code), this 
phenomenon was accelerated by the crisis, which particularly struck Portugal. In fact, the country was 
forced to require external financial aid and, as a condition to that assistance, a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed, demanding a number of alterations to labor law (among other areas) in 
order to create a more employer-friendly regulation and promote economical recovery.  
 We try and will analyze these changes, their reception amongst social partners, as well as their 
practical enforcement.  
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Introduction 
 The present study addresses the recent changes featured in Portuguese Labor 
Law, both at individual and collective relations.  
 Although some of these changes had already been put in motion before the 
crisis (the blurring of the favor laboratoris principle, the introduction of more flexible 
working time schemes, and so forth), they were reinforced and deepened after 2011. 
The driving force behind this new legislative boost were the Memoranda agreed 
between the Portuguese State and the Troika (composed by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). 
These Memoranda were a condition to the external financial aid the country required. 
And, basically, it ensured that Portugal would conduct a series of structural reforms 
concerning fiscal policy, financial sector regulation and supervision; budgetary 
framework; health care system; public-private partnerships; state-owned enterprises; 
public administration; education; goods and service markets; housing markets; the 
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judicial system, and so on2. And, naturally, labor law. On this last matter, the key 
purpose was to diminish the risk of long-term unemployment, to reduce the labor 
market segmentation, to foster job creation and to ease the transition of workers from 
jobs, firms and sectors3. We will begin with the innovations introduced on the 
individual relations and we will address collective relations in the second part.  
 
Part I – Developments in individual labor law 
 1. Severance payments  
One of the demands from the Memorandum was the reduction of severance 
payments amounts, in order to provide for their alignment with the prevailing average 
in the EU4. This led to the phased downgrading of severance payments due to 
employees in case of extinction of the work post, employee’s unsuitability and 
collective terminations.  
In its original wording, Article 366 of the Labor Code provided for a 
compensation of one month for each complete year of service5. There was no 
maximum threshold for the compensation, whereas there was a three-month payment 
minimum, and collective agreements could choose a more favorable formula. 
Nowadays, some decrees later6, the payment is of 12 days per complete year of 
service. And the new regime carries some difficulties, due to its complex transitional 
rules (which distinguish the applicable regime depending on the dates the contracts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality of 17th May 
2011, as well as the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies and the Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding, can be found, in both English and Portuguese versions, at 
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/os-temas/memorandos/memorandos.aspx. All references on the text to 
the Memorandum refer to the first one. All references on text to legal provisions, without mention of 
diploma, belong to the Portuguese Labor Code.  
3 Paragraph 4 of the Memorandum. Due to the extension and purpose of this article, we will 
not be able to address the measure aimed at the labor relations of civil servants. Nevertheless, the main 
innovations on this domain were: the promotion of civil servants’ mobility (within local, regional, and 
central administration); the revision of the salary policy; the limitation of promotions and the freezing 
of wages and hiring; the cutting-back of costs related with health systems; and the reduction of 
pensions above a certain amount. 
4 However, although severance parameters were, indeed, lower in other European countries, 
their wages are higher and collective bargaining, as well as social plans, substantially raise legal 
compensations. Hence, this alignment was more illusory than real – Lobo Xavier (2012), 76. 
5 The year fractions are calculated in a proportionate manner – Article 366, no. 2.  
6 Act no. 53/2011, 14th October, reduced the compensation to 20 days of payment (per 
complete year of service). And it determined that the final amount could not be higher than 12 months 
of salary (and the monthly salary used for these sums could not be higher than 20 minimum wages). 
Initially, this regime was only applicable to new labor contracts, but Act no. 23/2012, 25th June, 
extended it to all contracts. 
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were entered into, but also differentiate periods of contract execution, associating 
different criteria to each separate period)7.  
The result of these continuous amendments is a very complex system8 that 
hardened the task of employers9. Still, it is considered a balanced solution, since it 
protects employees’ expectations10. 
 
 2. Grounds for individual dismissals 
With the intention of fighting market segmentation, the Memorandum 
demanded for a number of changes regarding the grounds for individual dismissals. 
The argument was that if it were easier to terminate open-ended contracts, employers 
would more frequently resort to this form of hiring11. Bearing this in mind, it asked 
for individual dismissals due to unsuitability of the employee to be possible even 
without the introduction of new technologies or other changes to the workplace. This 
imposition was implemented by Act no. 23/2012.  
The constitutionality of this alteration was challenged before the 
Constitutional Court, on the grounds that it violated the prohibition of dismissals 
without a fair cause (Art. 53 of the Portuguese Constitution), as it was feared that it 
would lead to unjustified and arbitrary dismissals. The Court, however, deemed it 
valid, since there are enough guarantees to ensure a fair evaluation of the employers’ 
performance. Plus, it would not be reasonable to force the employer to keep this 
worker when the decrease in quality or quantity is definitive (see Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court no. 602/2013)12.  
Act no. 23/2012 also targeted dismissals linked to the extinction of work 
positions, following the idea, present in the Memorandum, that these dismissals 
should not have to follow a pre-defined seniority order, when more than one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7A special rule was created for fixed-term contracts and temporary employment contracts, 
alternating criteria according to the moment those contracts were entered into and whether they were 
subjected to extraordinary extensions.  
8 Monteiro Fernandes (2014b), 569. 
9 See http://www.publico.pt/economia/memorando-da-troika-anotado (7/08/2015).  
10 Rosário Ramalho (2014), 1038. 
11 Paragraph 4. 5., of the Memorandum. Júlio Gomes ((2012), 578) challenges this idea, since 
everything indicates that employers hire because they have a need for manpower, and not because it is 
easier to dismiss.  
12 Available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/acordaos/20130602.html (7/08/2015). 
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employee is assigned to those functions. Therefore, it only asked for the employer to 
establish ‘a relevant and non-discriminatory alternative criterion’13.  
The validity of this change was also questioned before the Constitutional 
Court, with the argument that the new rule enabled ‘custom-made’ dismissals, 
allowing the employer to choose the most convenient criteria in order to dismiss 
specific employees he wished to dismiss (but against whom he had no fair cause). The 
Court agreed with the petitioners and declared the new rules unconstitutional. 
Following this decision, the legislator modified the Labor Code once again, and, 
today, in order to execute this sort of dismissal, the employer has to follow this 
hierarchized criteria: worst performance review; lower academic and professional 
qualifications; heavier burden in maintaining the contractual bond; less experience at 
the work post and less seniority. Monteiro Fernandes14 disagrees with the current 
path. In fact, the previous grounds aimed at preventing discretion and discrimination, 
and protecting more vulnerable workers. However, the new requisites merely try and 
implement objectivity, lacking the previous social purpose.  
Additionally, the Memoradum stated that these dismissals should not be 
subject to the obligation of previously attempting to transfer the employee to an 
available compatible position15. This duty was present both for dismissals due to the 
extinction of the work position and unsuitability of the employee. However, Act no. 
23/2012 eliminated it. Faced with the change, the Constitutional Court declared it 
unconstitutional, because it enable the dismissal of an employee when, in fact, it is 
feasible to keep him in another position, violating the prohibition of dismissals 
without a fair cause (see Judgment of the Constitutional Court no. 602/2013). Once 
again, following this decision, the legislator gave a step back and reinstated this 
obligation16.  
 
3. Working time schemes  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Paragraph 4. 5. ii), of the Memorandum.  
14 Monteiro Fernandes (2014a), 397-398. 
15 Paragraph 4. 5. iii), of the Memorandum. See Monteiro Fernandes (2014b), 547. Therefore, 
if there was any post available and compatible with the professional qualifications and the aptitude of 
the employee, the employer had to offer it to him. Only if the employee declined, would then the 
employer be able to proceed with the dismissal – Monteiro Fernandes (2014b), 394. 
16 Currently, it can be found in Articles 368, no. 4, (dismissal due to the extinction of work 
post) and 375, no. 1, d), (dismissal due to unsuitability of the employee). 
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On this matter, the Memoradum advocated for the easier introduction and 
renewal of working time arrangements and short-time working schemes in case of 
industrial crisis17. Specifically, it wished for the possibility of implementing a ‘bank 
of hours’ by direct agreement between employees and employer. This was 
accomplished with the introduction of the ‘individual bank of hours’ and the ‘group 
bank of hours’, adding to the pre-existent ‘bank of hours’ – which was renamed as 
‘collective bank of hours’. 
The collective bank of hours is instituted by a collective agreement and it 
allows for the normal period of a day’s work to be increased up to four hours; and 
also the extension of the normal week’s working period up to 60 hours (with the 
maximum limit of 200 hours)18. The collective agreement must provide for a 
compensation, which may correspond to extra salary, to the equivalent reduction of 
working time or, since 2012, to the extension of holidays19. The new individual bank 
of hours (Article 208-A) allows access this regime through an ad hoc agreement 
signed directly between employer and employee or through a general proposal from 
the employer to which the workers may oppose in writing, within 14 days20. Finally, 
the group bank of hours (see Article 208-B) allows the extension of the other banks of 
hours (collective and individual) to employees initially unaffected by these 
mechanisms. This lack of initial coverage may happen because these workers are not 
affiliated to the trade union that entered into the agreement that provides for the 
collective bank of hours. Or, in case of the individual bank of hours, it may occur 
because the employee has not signed the ad hoc agreement or has opposed the general 
proposal presented by the employer. This extension can be achieved through one of 
two paths: A) the agreement that provides the collective bank of hours enables the 
employer to extend this regime to a group of workers, as long as it is originally 
applicable to 60% of the employees of that team, section, or economic entity21. Or B) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See paragraph 4. 6. i), and ii), of the Memorandum.  
18 Vide Article 208, no. 2. These limits may be surpassed in case of business crisis (Article 
208, no. 3).  
19 See Article 208, no. 4. However, Nunes de Carvalho ((2012), 27) argues that these are not 
truly vacation days, since the employer will not have to pay holiday allowance. Similarly, Monteiro 
Fernandes (2012a), 104. 
20 Vide Article 205, no. 5, ex vi Article 208-A, no. 2. Either the ad hoc agreement, or the 
general proposal must state the compensation method for the extra work, and the possibilities are the 
same as in the collective bank of hours. It enables the normal period of a day’s work to be increased by 
up to two hours; and the extension of the normal week’s working period up to 50 hours (with the 
maximum limit of 150 hours). 
21 See Articles 206, no. 1, ex vi 208-B, no. 1.  
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the general proposal, aimed at the individual bank of hours, was accepted by, at least, 
75% of a team, section, or economic entity, allowing the employer to apply it to the 
remaining workers of that structure22. Employees covered by a collective agreement 
that provides for an opposing regime are exempt in both cases and, regarding only the 
first, so will be the ones affiliated to a trade union that opposed the extension of the 
collective agreement in question23. 
There are several doubts surrounding the bank of hours. For instance, the 
notions of team, section, and economic entity, as well as the measurement of the 
threshold percentages are imprecise24. And this provides the employer with a higher 
degree of discretion; particularly since statute does not offer endow the employees 
with an “opposition right”25. Furthermore, and in order avoid hidden unilateral 
impositions, the collective bank of hours should have been given a prominent role, 
only allowing the other options when, after a serious negotiation, the agreement is 
unattainable26. 
The Constitutional Court was also called to evaluate the compatibility of these 
mechanisms with the Constitution (see Judgment of the Constitutional Court no. 
602/2013). The petitioners argued that the individual bank of hours placed employees 
in a vulnerable position, due to their difficulty to refuse it. Whereas the group bank of 
hours violates freedom of association, for it applies the conditions of a collective 
agreement to a worker that lacks affiliation to the signing trade union. Furthermore, 
both modalities aggravate the conciliation between professional activity and personal 
and family lives (safeguarded by the Constitution – see Article 59, no. 1, b)). The 
Constitutional Court however rebutted these arguments and considered them both 
valid. We do not share the Court’s point of view. Particularly, regarding the group 
bank of hours, although the Constitution allows for the (administrative) extension of 
collective agreements, as we will see ahead, this possibility must be carefully 
weighed. Firstly, the representativeness of trade unions should be ensured (which 
does not happen under Portuguese law). In addition, this is a peculiar of extension, 
since it merely targets part of the agreement. However, collective agreements are the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Vide Articles 206, no. 3, ex vi 208-B, no. 2.  
23 See Article 208-B, no. 3.  
24 Nunes de Carvalho (2012), 32-33. 
25 Nunes de Carvalho ((2012), 33-35) and Monteiro Fernandes ((2012a), 103) uphold the 
employee’s right to oppose to the application of the group bank of hours, based on labor law principles 
and parallel dispositions of the Labor Code. 
26 Idem, ibidem. 
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product of negotiation. This means that, while it supplies the bank of hours, the 
agreement, most likely, offers some kind of benefit towards the employees (aside 
from the methods of compensation provided by statute). But the workers affected by 
the group bank of hours will only have access to its legal regime, without those other 
benefits. It is an extension merely in pejus. Therefore, in our opinion, the group bank 
of hours violates the Constitution. 
 
4. Overtime work and public holidays 
Another set of requests from the Memoradum aimed at the regulation of 
overtime work. In fact, it asked for the reduction of the additional pay to a maximum 
50% 27 , and also for the elimination of the compensatory time off 28 . These 
recommendations were implemented in the 2012 labor reform, embodied in Act no. 
23/2012, which revoked Article 229, nos. 1, 2, and 6, (compensatory time off) and 
changed Articles 268 and 269 (payment of overtime work). Furthermore, despite 
being absent from the document, four holidays were eliminated by this reform29.  
Once again, and in spite of the public outcry about the value of work and the 
important of the right to leisure and rest, the Constitutional Court agreed to these 
measures (see Judgment of the Constitutional Court no. 602/2013).  
 
5. Extra measures 
In addition to these changes, the legislator targeted the pre-existing collective 
agreements that covered these subjects, in order to create a protective barrier against 
the ‘past’.30 Aiming at this intention, Article 7, of Act no. 23/2012, determined that 
the clauses of such agreements were to be: 
- null and void (when disposing over severance payments, in case of extinction of the 
work post, unsuitability of the employee or collective termination; and when 
providing for a compensatory time off regarding overtime work);31 
- and suspended (when conceding an additional payment for overtime work, higher 
than the one provided by statute)32. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 While previously employees were granted an extra 50% pay for the first hour of overtime 
work, 75% for the additional hours and 100% for overtime during holidays. 
28 The Memorandum stated, however, the possibility of such norms being revised, upwards 
and downwards, by collective bargaining – according to paragraph 4. 6. ii), of the Memorandum.  
29 See Article 234, no. 1.  
30 Monteiro Fernandes (2012b), 558. 
31 See Article 7, nos. 1 and 2, of Act no. 23/2012.  
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Several Authors characterized this rule as bizarre33  and once again, the 
Constitutional Court was called in to pronounce itself. The petitioners claimed that 
Article 7 was invalid, since it violated the right to collective bargaining. In fact, the 
subjects addressed by these clauses (now at stake) are part of the ‘reserve’ of 
collective bargaining (a fundamental right, enshrined in Article 56 of the 
Constitution), which prevents any legislative intervention. The Court argued that, 
regarding severance payments’ clauses, there was no interference with the ‘reserve’ of 
collective bargaining. In fact, since this is highly imperative subject, collective 
agreements are merely able to determine some of its aspects. However, it recognized 
that was not the case with compensatory time off in case of overtime work. In fact, 
this is a field particularly devoted to collective bargaining, so the new rules were 
interfering with the reserve of collective bargaining. And considering that new 
agreements could provide the same set of clauses on these subjects, the intervention in 
the previous agreements was unnecessary and inadequate to its finality (which was 
the standardization of labor conditions). For this reason, the Court deemed this change 
unconstitutional. In turn, the suspension of clauses providing for additional pay for 
overtime work higher than the legal stipulation was considered valid. In fact, such 
suspension affected not only the previous but also the new agreements celebrated for 
a period of two years. Therefore, despite interfering with the reserve of collective 
bargaining, this measure was adequate to fulfill its purpose34.  
 
6. Minimum wage  
 Finally, the Memorandum also targeted minimum wage. It stated that ‘over the 
program period, any increase in the minimum wage will take place only if justified by 
economic and labor market developments and agreed in the framework of the 
program review’35. And the government pledged not to raise minimum wage for the 
duration of the program, unless the Troika gave its consent.  
The Constitution does not prohibit the maintenance of the minimum wage’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Article 7, nos. 4, of Act no. 23/2012. It was also determined that if, within two years, 
the suspended clauses were not altered, the sums they provided should be reduced to half (with the 
limit of the amount enshrined in statute) – according to Article 7, no. 5.  
33 Nunes de Carvalho (2012), 37-38; Monteiro Fernandes (2012b), 558. 
34 The reduction, mentioned in fn. 32, was also deemed unconstitutional. Because it meddled 
with the reserve of collective bargaining and it was not adequate (unnecessary) to reach its purpose. In 
fact, after these two years, new agreements would be able to provide for more favorable regimes.  
35 See paragraph 4. 7. i), of the Memorandum.  
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amount in situations of true national disgrace. Yet, it is possible to determine different 
minimum wages, according to the characteristics of each sector or even enterprise. 
Although this is not the current option, the legislator has previously implemented that 
solution. For this reason, some Authors questioned the constitutionality of this 
imposition, since it froze the minimum wage not only for debilitated companies, but 
also for profitable and stable ones. Furthermore, this policy was insensitive to the 
existence of primary social needs, precisely when the country was going through a 
general and extraordinary increase in the cost of life, deepening the inequalities in one 
of the most unequal countries of the EU36. Furthermore, in case of improvement of 
Portugal’s financial and economic state, it would still be necessary to obtain the 
Troika’s approval to change the amount of minimum wages. Despite these objections, 
the minimum wage stayed untouched (at 485 euros) from 2011, until recently Decree-
Law no. 144/2014, 30th September, raised it to 505 euros37. Currently, its amount is 
530 euros, by Decree-Law no. 254-A/2015, 31st December.  
 
Part II – Developments in collective labor law 
1. The extension of collective agreements by State intervention 
 Concerning this matter, the Memorandum stressed the need to define clear 
criteria for the extension of collective agreements. The representativeness of the 
negotiating organizations and the implications of the extension for the competitive 
position of nonaffiliated firms should be among these requisites38. This demand was 
fulfilled by the Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 90/2012. And so, according 
to this legal instrument, for now on, an agreement will only be open to extension by 
State intervention if the following conditions are met: 1) the extension of an 
agreement must be required by its signing parties (one trade union and one 
employers’ association); and 2) in order for all of the enterprises (and employees) of 
the sector to be included in the scope of the extension, the employer’s side of the 
convention must employ, at least, 50% of the workforce of that sector or the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 João Reis (2012), 137-138. 
37 Vide Article 2 of this legal instrument.  
38 Paragraph 4. 7. ii), of the Memorandum: ‘(…) the Government will: (…) define clear 
criteria to be followed for the extension of collective agreements and commit to them. The 
representativeness of the negotiating organisations and the implications of the extension for the 
competitive position of non-affiliated firms will have to be among these criteria’. 
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employers’ association that signed the agreement must be composed, in at least 30%, 
by small and medium enterprises39.  
To understand the impact of this change, we must first have of glimpse of the 
most significant aspects of Portuguese collective relations. Under Portuguese law40 
(the same goes for the German or Italian regimes), collective agreements only cover 
employees affiliated to the trade union that signed them with their employer (or with 
the employer’s association the latter belongs to)41. Therefore, employees lacking trade 
union membership, or members of a competing union, will not be covered by the 
agreement42. Consequently extension mechanisms expand the advantages associated 
to collective bargaining, granting the access to these conditions to employees who, 
otherwise, would not enjoy them43. Particularly in Portugal, and considering the 
heavy presence of SMEs44, the low union density45, and the limited effect of 
collective agreements (principle of ‘affiliation’), this means that most employers and 
employees are excluded from the direct scope of negotiation. In fact, SMEs generally 
stand apart from collective bargaining46, since they feel more acutely the global 
phenomenon of decrease in union membership47. Additionally, they also often lack 
representative institutions for the personnel and employers’ affiliation is also 
reduced48. And despite having legitimacy to celebrate agreements by themselves with 
trade unions, these employers show a tendency to direct negotiation with their 
employees, due to their (usually) more traditional and paternalistic mentality49. 
Since this ultimately leads to the removal of these employees from collective 
bargaining, one could assume that the effectiveness of collective bargaining is very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This second alternative was added by Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 43/2014. 
40 See Article 496, no. 1. 
41 Robert Rebhahn (2003), 283. 
42  Unlike regulations found in France, Belgium, Austria, and Finland, where when an 
employer (or an employers’ association) enters into an agreement it binds all the employees of the 
undertaking. Even if they are not members of the signing trade union or if they are affiliated to a 
competing trade union. These agreements carry an outsider effect – vd. Robert Rebhahn (2003), 283, 
287; Pélissier, Auzero, and Dockès, (2013), 1341. 
43 Robert Rebhahn (2003), 290. 
44 As of 2008, 99.7% of the non-financial societies were SMEs (Estudos sobre Estatísticas 
Estruturais das Empresas, 2010). 
45 Despite the lack of official data, it is estimated that the Portuguese trade union rates are 
situated around 18.4% (Livro Branco das Relações Laborais, 2007, 72). 
46 Catarina Carvalho (2011), 632-633; Marco Biagi (1993), 26.  
47 Bouquin, Leonardi, and Moore (2007), 17. 
48 Marco Biagi (1993), 26; Catarina Carvalho (2011), 608-609, 633. 
49 Marie-France Mialon (1993), 63. 
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narrow. And yet, around 92 % of workers50 were, until very recently, covered by 
these agreements, as a direct consequence of the quite liberal usage of the extension 
of collective agreements, the ‘true star in the sky of the Portuguese collective 
autonomy’51. Lately, however, the number of extensions has diminished quite visibly. 
While in 2009 and 2010, respectively, 103 and 113 took place; in 2012 only 12 
materialized, and nine in 2013. Finally, in 2014 only 13 extensions were produced 
and in 2015 merely 23 were created52. The reason behind this inflection was the 
change of the conditions required for the extensions. Before this alteration, extensions 
were unchained under the discretionary power of public administration53. All this 
changed with the Resolutions of Council of Ministers.  
We believe it was, in fact, necessary to make some changes, in order to better 
protect undertakings and their competitive position (ensuring that extensions will not 
be used as a way to distort competition), and to overcome the inconveniences created 
by the lack of criteria of trade unions’ representativeness (along with the absence of 
official data regarding this element). Nonetheless, these alterations have been amidst 
controversy and provoked several practical problems. On one hand, they had the self-
proclaimed intent of promoting collective bargaining in Portugal. This goal was not 
achieved, since there was not only a significant decrease of extensions, but also the 
reduction of new agreements. As it seems, the willingness of social partners to 
participate in collective bargaining lessens when there are fewer guarantees that the 
same conditions will be extended to their competitors. In addition, the new requisites 
do not meet the exact impositions of the Memorandum, since it asked for the 
representativeness of both social partners to be taken into account (and the Resolution 
omit any reference to trade unions) and for the evaluation on the effects towards 
competitors (another absence). All of this easily explains the displeasure displayed by 
social partners. Particularly since the number of covered employees (directly or 
otherwise) has severely decreased. According to social partners, while in 2008, two 
million employees were covered by these agreements, in 2013 only 200,000 were 
benefiting from them54. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Estatísticas em síntese – Quadros de pessoal 2010, p. 6. A similarly high percentage is also 
present in France (around 90%), also thanks to frequent agreement extensions (Eurofound, (2011), 6). 
51 Jorge Leite (2007), 149. 
52 Available data at http://bte.gep.msess.gov.pt (20/07/2015).  
53 Júlio Gomes (2009), 95; and Nunes de Carvalho (1988), 442. 
54http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/emprego/lei_laboral/detalhe/ugt_alteracoes_ao_co
digo_do_trabalho_vao_ajudar_a_dinamizar_contratacao_colectiva.html (30/12/2014). 
	   12 
2. Other changes 
 Recently, Act no. 55/2014 introduced the possibility of suspending collective 
agreements55. The suspension requires the accord of the agreements’ parties, is merely 
temporary, may be total or partial, and must be due to a business crisis. Furthermore, 
this measure has to be indispensable to ensure the company’s viability and safeguard 
work posts. The legal rule, however, presents some interpretative doubts. In fact, it 
asks for an agreement between ‘employers’ associations and trade unions’. 
Considering that collective agreements can directly signed by employers, without the 
intervention of their associations, this begs the question of whether company level 
agreements may suspended. Either the legislator was imprecise, or it meant to 
circumscribe this possibility only to sector level agreements.  
 
Conclusions 
 The intervention of the Troika in Portugal was a turning point in our labor 
regime. Several significant changes had already been in course. However, the reforms 
of 2012 and subsequent years accelerated this process twofold. Particularly, Act no. 
23/2012 implemented measures that led to the decrease in labor costs (at the expense 
of workers’ rights); to the increment of the employers’ power of decision; and the 
neutralization of previous collective agreements. The idea behind these alterations is 
that economic development is achieved through low salaries and longer working 
hours56. Quite unimaginatively, the legislator seems to believe that labor law’s sole 
purpose is to increase competition and the only way to achieve it to reduce the cost of 
labor57. Labor law is becoming less and less oriented towards the protection of 
employees. Nowadays, weighed down by crisis, globalization and a dominant neo-
liberal ideology, it is growing more focused on the needs of companies and their 
competitive potential. And even the Portuguese Constitutional Court, rather than 
assuming an obstructive rule (as it has been accused), has evoked the conjuncture of 
financial emergency and the commitments assumed by the country to accepted most 
of these changes. We need to rethink the path we have taken. Labor law cannot ignore 
the challenges posed by the modern and globalized economy. However, it must try 
and preserve its genetic code, ensuring the protection of employees’ rights and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See Article 502, no. 2.  
56 Monteiro Fernandes (2014b), 552. 
57 Júlio Gomes (2012), 576. 
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interests. Especially since several fundamental rights are clearly at stake (rights 
recognized not only by the Portuguese Constitution, but also by international 
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